009. Interregnum III: Nominalism Conceals
The shaman's primary function is not healing. It is naming. To know the true name of the power afflicting the community — the spirit, the force, the energy operating beneath the surface of events — is the condition of any engagement with it. Without the name, there is no relationship. Without the relationship, there is no capacity to negotiate, propitiate, or combat. The unnamed power operates autonomously, without friction, without limit. The community it afflicts cannot even describe what is happening to it. It can only suffer the consequences of a force whose identity it has surrendered.
European modernity surrendered the names. It did so systematically, philosophically, over centuries, through the operation that William of Ockham initiated and the Enlightenment completed: the severance of the word from the energy it tracks. What remained was a civilization running on powers it could no longer identify, in a vocabulary built from the ruins of a language that once knew what those powers were. The interregnum — the condition diagnosed across these essays — is not only a political crisis or an institutional failure. It is, at its foundation, a crisis of naming. The unnamed energies have been operating in the political unconscious for so long that when they surface, the institutions charged with managing them have no tools. They were built for a world where the names are neutral. The powers are not.
I. The Theological Stripping
The first and most consequential act of nominalist concealment was theological, and it was performed on the vocabulary of Rome.
Sacramentum. In Roman military practice: the soldier's oath of absolute loyalty, sworn before the gods, binding unto death. The sacramentum was not a procedure or a formality. It was a sacred bond — a transaction between the soldier, his commander, and the divine order that sanctioned Roman power. To violate the sacramentum was not merely desertion. It was sacrilege, the rupture of a cosmic covenant. The energy encoded in the word: life-and-death binding, the subordination of the individual will to a sacred collective claim, the invocation of divine witness as enforcement mechanism.
Christianity absorbed the word. The sacrament became a rite through which divine grace was transmitted — still a sacred transaction, but now between the individual and God through the church. The martial energy — the oath, the absolute loyalty, the death-bound commitment — was sublimated into liturgical form. Then the Reformation contested the sacraments' number and mechanism, the Council of Trent fixed them at seven, and the Enlightenment inherited a word that now referred to a set of optional religious ceremonies performed by those who chose to affiliate with particular institutions. Three translations. The original energy — the soldier's total commitment before the gods — is unrecognizable.
And yet: the energy did not disappear. The demand for total commitment to a collective sacred project did not vanish because the vocabulary that named it was domesticated. It returned in the forms that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries produced: the nationalist oath, the party oath, the ideological commitment that asked everything and tolerated nothing. The sacramentum energy, unnamed and therefore unintegrated, erupted through the floor of secular modernity in 1914, in 1933, in 1936 — still demanding total commitment, still invoking something sacred, still binding unto death, but now stripped of every wisdom tradition that had developed, however imperfectly, to contain it.
Religio. The etymology is contested — from religare, to bind back, or relegere, to re-read, to consider carefully. Either derivation encodes an energy of obligation: the binding back to something that constitutes unconditional claim, or the careful return to what demands repeated attention. Religio was not a belief system. It was a set of obligations — to the gods, to the ancestors, to the community — that were not optional, not private, not matters of individual conscience. They were the structural conditions of civic life. The pontifex was the bridge-builder — the functionary who maintained the connections between the human and the divine orders that Roman political life required.
The word's journey into modernity produced a concept that is, structurally, the opposite of the original: a domain of private, voluntary, individual belief, protected from public interference, sequestered behind the wall of conscience, irrelevant to the governance of collective life. This is what the secular settlement required — and what it received. But the binding energy of religio — the sense that certain obligations constitute the community in ways that cannot be opted out of — did not disappear. It returned as political ideology, as nationalism, as the various secular religions that the nineteenth century diagnosed and participated in simultaneously. Religio unnamed is religio uncontrolled: it fuses with whatever political project is available and produces the fanaticism that voluntary, privatized, individual belief was supposed to have made impossible.
Imperium. The commander's right to command, established through auspicium — the reading of divine signs, the confirmation that the gods sanctioned this particular act of authority in this particular moment. Imperium was not power as such. It was divinely legitimated authority, specific, contextual, revocable. The imperator commanded because the augurs had confirmed the gods' approval. The energy encoded: authority is real, it is not self-generated, it requires something beyond itself to ground it, and that grounding must be continuously renewed.
The word became "empire," the territorial extension of political domination. Then "imperialism," a political-economic system of exploitation. Now a pejorative label. Three steps removed from the original. And the energy — the question of what grounds legitimate authority, what the source of the right to command actually is — has never been answered in modern political theory. It has only been deferred, through social contract fictions, through democratic mandate claims, through technocratic expertise claims. Each deferral is a nominalist operation: replace the question with a label, and act as if the label answers the question. The question remains. It surfaces in every legitimacy crisis — and legitimacy crises are the structural substance of the interregnum.
II. The Architecture of Forgetting
The theological stripping established the method. What followed was systematic.
Curriculum. The Latin: a running, a course — specifically, the track of the chariot race in the Circus. The curriculum was where Roman aristocratic males proved their competitive worth in violent, public, zero-sum contest. The energy: hierarchy is real, competition is violent, winners are distinguished from losers by something that matters, the race has stakes that exceed mere performance. "Curriculum" as course of study retains the word and loses everything it named. The educational system still runs the chariot race — the elite selection mechanisms of every European educational institution perform the same hierarchical sorting that the Circus performed, with the same zero-sum logic, the same winners and losers, the same reproduction of a ruling class. But because the word no longer names this, the institution cannot acknowledge it. Every meritocratic claim made by every elite educational system is a nominalist operation: call the chariot race a curriculum and the violence of selection becomes the neutral operation of merit.
Schola. From the Greek σχολή — leisure. Specifically, the leisure of the free man who is not compelled to labor: the time available to the non-slave for reflection, dialogue, and the cultivation of judgment. The schola was the condition of philosophical life, and philosophical life was the condition of genuine political participation. Only those with schola could truly deliberate; only those who deliberated could truly govern. The energy: learning requires freedom from compulsion; the capacity for genuine thought is not compatible with the condition of slavery.
The modern school is compulsory attendance. It is the negation of schola institutionalized as schola. The word that named freedom now names the mechanism of disciplinary formation — the place where children learn not freedom of thought but compliance with schedule, submission to evaluation, and the management of performance under surveillance. The concealment is total: the institution that produces the obedient subject of modern economic life carries the name of the institution that was supposed to produce the free citizen. No one asks why the school produces so little of what scholanamed, because the word no longer tells you what it should be producing.
Disciplina. The training of soldiers. The formation of the legionnaire's body and will through repetition, pain, and submission to command — the systematic production of men capable of acting with lethal precision under extreme duress. The energy: formation requires violence, the shaped self is the product of imposed constraint, competence is the residue of suffering applied with method.
"Discipline" now names an academic field (the disciplines), a character virtue (self-discipline), and an administrative sanction (disciplinary proceedings). The violent formation energy — the recognition that serious competence requires serious suffering, that the self must be broken before it can be rebuilt — has been dispersed across these neutral applications. What remains is the structure without the acknowledgment: academic disciplines impose their own formations, require their own submissions, produce their own suffering — and call it education. The nominalist concealment allows the institution to administer violence while maintaining the fiction of neutral knowledge transmission.
Virtus. From vir — man. The quality of the man: military prowess, civic courage, the capacity to act with force and decisiveness in the public arena. Virtus was not gentle. It was the excellence of the soldier-citizen who could fight when fighting was required and deliberate when deliberation was required, and who was capable of genuine distinction in both. The energy: excellence is gendered, it is martial, it is public, and it is rare.
"Virtue" in its modern usage refers to gentle moral goodness — honesty, kindness, reliability, the qualities of the compliant neighbor. The entire martial dimension has been evacuated. The energy did not disappear; it migrated into concepts like "leadership," "executive presence," and the various euphemisms by which elite institutions transmit the knowledge that certain kinds of aggressive, forceful, territorial behavior are still rewarded — while officially celebrating the domesticated virtue that replaced virtus in the vocabulary.
Oikonomia. Household management — the nomos (law, custom) of the oikos (household, family, the intimate community of face-to-face obligation). Greek household management was ethical before it was technical: the oikos was a community of persons with defined obligations to each other, and its management was inseparable from those relationships. The energy: economic life is embedded in personal obligation, the management of resources is inseparable from the management of relationships.
"Economy" now names a system — impersonal, self-regulating, governed by mechanisms rather than obligations, populated by rational actors rather than persons. The distance from oikonomia is total. And the energy that oikonomianamed — the embeddedness of economic life in relational obligation, the inseparability of transaction from personal accountability — has been precisely what three centuries of economic theory have worked to eliminate, theoretically and practically. The nominalist operation succeeded completely: the word is retained, the energy it tracked is not only forgotten but actively theorized out of existence.
Demokratia. Demos plus kratos: the power of the demos. The demos was not "the people" in the abstract. The demos was the poor, the many, the non-elite majority — specifically those who were not the aristoi (the excellent, the wealthy, the well-born). Athenian democracy was rule by the poor against the rich; the democratic institutions were designed to prevent the accumulation of power by the aristoi at the expense of the demos. The energy: democracy is a class instrument, it is the political form of the non-elite majority's claim against elite domination, and it has a specific enemy.
"Democracy" is now the universal legitimizing label for whatever political system is in power in any country that the international liberal order considers acceptable. It has been detached from the demos entirely — democratic systems consistently produce governments that serve elite interests, and this produces no contradiction in the vocabulary because "democracy" no longer names what demokratia named. The word has been emptied so completely that it can be applied to systems that the Athenians would have recognized immediately as oligarchy. And because the class-conflict energy of demokratia has been nominalized away, the structural conflict between the demos and the aristoi — which the interregnum is partly expressing — cannot be named for what it is.
III. The Nominalist Operation
William of Ockham's razor: entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. Universals — the real things that general words refer to — are not necessary. Only individual things exist. "Justice" does not refer to a real thing, Justice; it refers to a mental concept that groups together certain individual acts. The name tracks a habit of mind, not a reality.
This is the philosophical license for what followed. If words refer only to mental categories and not to real energies, then words can be redefined without cost. The curriculum can be redefined as "course of study" and nothing is lost, because "chariot course" was only a mental category to begin with. The redefinition is purely nominal. The energy — if energies even exist, which Ockham's framework makes unnecessary — is irrelevant.
Medieval realism held the opposite: universals are real. The word "justice" participates in Justice, which is a real thing. Names are not arbitrary labels; they are participations in the realities they name. To name correctly is to engage with the real; to name incorrectly is to be out of relationship with the real — which is not merely an intellectual error but an ontological failure with practical consequences.
The shamanic tradition — which predates both and is the ancestral form of what realism tried to philosophically articulate — held this absolutely: the name is the power. To speak the name correctly is to invoke the power. To speak it incorrectly, or to not know it, is to be helpless before it. The shaman's knowledge was a vocabulary of true names, and the loss of that vocabulary was the loss of the community's capacity to navigate the world of powers in which it lived.
Nominalism won. It produced the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and the institutional vocabulary of European modernity. It also produced a civilization that runs on powers it cannot name.
IV. What Jung Understood
Carl Jung's concept of the Shadow: the material rejected by consciousness does not disappear. It descends into the unconscious, where it operates autonomously, outside the ego's control. And — crucially — it projects outward. What I cannot acknowledge in myself, I see in you. The unrecognized content of my psyche appears to me as your threatening characteristic.
Applied collectively: the political Shadow of European modernity contains everything that the nominalist vocabulary cannot name. The violence of the curriculum. The compulsion of the schola. The class war of demokratia. The binding terror of religio. The sacred oath of the sacramentum. These energies, unnamed and therefore unintegrated, constitute the collective political unconscious of European institutions — and they project.
The European Commission projects its own Singular Truth theological drive onto "populism." It sees in Orbán the authoritarianism it cannot acknowledge in its own conditionality mechanisms. Orbán projects his own mimetic desire for domination onto "Brussels globalism." He sees in the Commission the imperial dissolution he cannot acknowledge his own system performs on Hungarian civil society. Both projections are precise: each actor sees in the other the shadow content it most needs to disown. This is not hypocrisy. It is the structural consequence of operating with a vocabulary that cannot name what is actually happening.
Jung called the uninitiated encounter with shadow content enantiodromia — the tendency of things pushed to one extreme to flip into their opposite. The process that represses the energy most completely produces the most violent return. European modernity's systematic nominalist repression of political-theological energies did not neutralize those energies. It stored them. The interregnum is the storage failure.
V. Naming as Control: The Exposure
The argument now requires demonstration. If naming is the condition of control, then each nominalist concealment should produce a specific, identifiable failure of control — a place where the energy runs without friction because the institution cannot recognize what it is encountering. Here they are.
"Rule of Law" conceals Ius — not "law" in the procedural sense, but the Roman concept of right relationship, the ordering of human community according to what is genuinely owed between persons and institutions. Ius had a substantive content: it was not whatever the legislature decreed but what right order required. "Rule of law" has been emptied into pure procedure: whatever the legally established process produces is, by definition, law, and law is, by definition, legitimate. The EU enforces "rule of law" as a condition of membership — but cannot specify what ius it is protecting, because ius requires a substantive account of right order that the nominalist framework forbids. The result: "rule of law" means the Commission's preferred institutional arrangements, which means Singular Truth enforced as universal procedure. Budapest and Warsaw correctly perceive that "rule of law" means something specific — a particular political-theological settlement — dressed in universal clothing. They are right. The institution cannot acknowledge it because the vocabulary does not permit the acknowledgment. The energy — the specific theological claim being made — operates without name, and therefore without accountability.
"Democratic values" conceals Demokratia's class energy. European institutions deploy "democratic values" as a universal norm while consistently producing outcomes that serve financial and technocratic elites at the expense of the demos. The yellow vests, Brexit, the AfD — these are demos energies erupting against aristoi institutions. The nominalist operation that emptied demokratia of its class content means the institution cannot recognize these eruptions as democratic in the original sense — as the assertion of the many against the few. It can only read them as threats to democracy. The energy is democratic. The vocabulary says it is anti-democratic. The institution has no tools to engage what its vocabulary mis-identifies.
"Populism" conceals the Sacred Wound grammar — the martyrological political theology of communities constituted by their wounds, operating through the logic of sacred violation and righteous vindication. "Populism" is a purely derogatory nominalist label that describes the symptom (appeal to "the people" against "the elite") while concealing the theological structure underneath. You cannot negotiate with populism. You can negotiate with a community whose political grammar is martyrological, if you understand what the grammar requires: acknowledgment of the wound, genuine engagement with the claim for vindication, and the recognition that no procedural correction will substitute for the substantive recognition. The vocabulary prevents all of this. The institution encounters Sacred Wound and reads "democratic backsliding." The energy escalates because nothing real has been named.
"European integration" conceals the Babel project — the attempt to create a common language that would prevent dispersion, pursued by a civilization whose constitutive energies are incommensurable. The nominalist label "integration" implies a process of combination that preserves the combined elements while producing something larger. What is actually happening is the contest between three political-theological grammars — Gap, Singular Truth, Sacred Wound — that cannot be integrated because they do not share the premises that integration would require. Calling the contest "integration" prevents the recognition of what it actually is. The institution continues to apply integration procedures to a theological conflict. The conflict continues to resist integration. The baroque procedural complexity multiplies. The energy — irresolvable, unnamed — accelerates.
"Secular" conceals Saeculum — the age, the era, the temporal order. The medieval distinction between the sacred and the secular was a distinction between two modes of the same reality, not a partition of reality into religious and non-religious domains. The saeculum was the temporal dimension of a world that was also, in its other dimension, sacred. "Secular" in its modern sense means the domain from which the sacred has been excluded — the space of neutral, non-theological governance. This concealment is the most consequential, because it is the precondition of all the others. The claim that European political institutions operate in a secular space — free from theological commitments — is the nominalist operation that makes the entire concealment architecture possible. If the political is secular, then identifying political-theological grammars is a category error. If the political is secular, then calling "rule of law" a theological commitment is confused. The "secular" label is what allows the system to claim it is doing something other than what it is doing. Remove it — acknowledge that the saeculum was never free of the sacred, that European political institutions are operating theological commitments they cannot name — and the entire concealment architecture is exposed.
The shaman who has lost the names is not thereby free of the powers. The powers continue to operate. They operate, now, without the friction of acknowledgment, without the wisdom traditions that developed around their correct naming, without the community's capacity to recognize what is happening when they surface.
European modernity lost the names across a period of five centuries, through a philosophical operation it called progress, enlightenment, and the liberation of reason from superstition. What it liberated was not reason. It liberated the powers from the names that had kept them in a working relationship with human community.
The interregnum is the condition of a civilization that is being acted upon by energies it systematically trained itself not to see. The curriculum is still a chariot race. The school is still a site of compulsion. The demos is still in conflict with the aristoi. The sacramentum is still being demanded, by states, by ideologies, by the European project itself. The religio — the binding back, the unconditional obligation — has not gone anywhere. It has only changed its explicit object.
To name these things correctly is not nostalgia for Latin. It is the recovery of the analytical capacity that the nominalist operation destroyed. You cannot address what you cannot name. You cannot control what you will not acknowledge. The interregnum will not be resolved by more procedure, more institutional complexity, more baroque elaboration of mechanisms that were designed to manage energies whose names have been forgotten.
It will not be resolved at all until someone is willing to say what the powers actually are.
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