E046. There is Something III:The Vanishing Point

E046. There is Something III:The Vanishing Point
Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Children's Games, 1560. Peripheralized by the very canon whose central trick it had already refused.

Being the Third and Final Day of the Second Sojourn of Alfred North Whitehead, O.M., in Which He Visits a Museum, Discovers the Hidden Geometry of Power in the Trick of Perspective, and Reconstructs—in Seven Movements, Delivered to No One, Before a Painting of a City With No People in It—the Whole Mechanism by Which a Hollow Man Makes Himself the Center of the World and Seals the Exits Behind Him.


"Perspective makes the single eye the centre of the visible world." —Berger (16)


I. The Window That Is a Wall

On his third day he went, at last, to look at beautiful things, having spent the first two among the codes and the captured and feeling the need of the company of objects that did not argue back.

The museum sat at the edge of the park like a great pale liner run aground, and he drifted through its rooms with the particular happiness of a man who has all of eternity and no appointments. He passed the Egyptians, who had drawn the world flat and frontal and hierarchical, the pharaoh enormous and the slave a thumbnail, with no pretense whatever that this was how an eye actually saw—a hierarchy confessed, painted plainly on the surface as the lie it knew itself to be. He found this oddly restful. And then he turned a corner into a room of early Italian paintings, and stopped before a small panel, and stood there for the better part of an hour, and understood the entire architecture of his third day.

It was a painting of a city. An ideal city, of the kind the quattrocento loved to imagine—variously attributed, the little card said, to the circle of Piero della Francesca—a perfect piazza of perfect buildings receding toward a perfect rotunda at the center, every paving stone and cornice and window obeying a single iron law, every line in the painting hurrying, as if summoned, toward one point on the horizon. It was geometry made into longing. And it was completely, immaculately, chillingly empty. There was not one human being in it. A city built to the most exquisite specification, and no one had come to live in it, and one understood, looking, that no one ever would, because there was no room in such a city for anyone but the eye it had been built to flatter.

Perspective. He had lived through its long reign and never, until this moment, seen it whole.

It had been invented—this was the first thing one had to grasp, and it took an effort, because the trick had become so total that it now passed for sight itself—it had been invented, in Florence, around 1420, by a goldsmith and an architect, and codified a decade later by Alberti, who in his little book on painting gave the world its governing metaphor: the picture as an open window, a finestra aperta, through which one looked onto the world (Alberti). A window. How modest it sounded. And how false the modesty, for a window implies a wall, and the whole genius of the device was to make you forget the wall and believe you were looking through, when in fact you were looking at—at a flat plane on which a man had arranged a hierarchy of sizes and placements so cunningly that the hierarchy disappeared into the appearance of mere truth.

A great art historian of his own century had seen it. Perspective, Panofsky had argued, was not nature and not vision; it was a symbolic form—a worldview disguised as an optics, a historically particular way of organizing space that a particular civilization had mistaken for space itself (Panofsky). And a writer of this present century had said the political thing even more plainly, and Whitehead found the sentence surfacing in him now as he stood before the empty city: that perspective made the single eye <"the centre of the visible world"> (Berger 16), arranging the whole of the visible, as Berger had put it, for one spectator exactly as the universe had once been thought arranged for God. Every line knelt toward one point. And at that point there was no reciprocity—the spectator saw everything and was seen by nothing; he did not need to situate himself among others, because he was the situation, the still center around which a kneeling world arranged itself.

Hierarchy, Whitehead thought, is an illusion painted on a plane. The pharaoh's hierarchy had at least been honest; it sat on the surface and admitted it was a convention. Perspective's hierarchy was the dangerous kind, the kind that hid inside the appearance of objectivity, that said this is not my arrangement, this is simply how things are. And the center of it—the vanishing point, the rotunda, the throne—was the most fraudulent thing in the painting. Because the vanishing point did not generate the lines. The lines generated the vanishing point. It was an effect, not a cause; a place where the converging sightlines of the periphery happened to meet, and which then, by a sleight no one quite noticed, was promoted to the origin from which everything seemed to flow. The center was generated by the periphery and then turned and claimed to have generated it. The throne was made by the kneeling and then declared the kneeling to be its due.

He thought, standing there: is process, then, the dissipation of hierarchy? For a process is a flowing, an advance, a perpetual handing-on in which no moment can freeze itself into a permanent center; and a hierarchy is precisely a freezing, a still picture, a vanishing point insisting it will not vanish. And if that were so—he followed the thought down with the strange equanimity of the already dead—then death was perhaps the most processual thing of all, the final and total dissipation of every center a life had pretended to be, the moment the held picture at last lets go and rejoins the flow it had been resisting. The narcissist's true horror, he saw, was not death as an event but death as a revelation: the disclosure that he had been a vanishing point all along, an effect of other people's looking, and that when they looked away he would simply not be there.

And what was a society, after all, but a vast perspective—etiquette, hierarchy, custom, tradition, all of it a great theater in which each took the place the staging had assigned? Theatrum mundi, the old phrase. A sociologist of this century, Goffman, had shown it in undeniable detail: that the self is a performance, front-stage and back, a managed impression continuously staged for an audience (Goffman). It was a melancholy doctrine and Whitehead had always resisted its reduction—but he could not deny its descriptive force, and he found the question it raised pressing on him before the empty city: if all the world is a stage, then what is a human being if not an actor?

And here was where it turned, and turned dark. For most actors know they are acting. Most centers are content to be temporary—to hold the stage an evening and yield it, to be a vanishing point that consents, in the end, to vanish. That consent is grace; it is the willingness to be a process rather than a monument. But there is one kind of actor who forgets he is acting. One kind of center that cannot bear to be an effect of the periphery's gaze and so sets out to make the gaze permanent—to freeze the painting, to fix every line forever toward himself, to peripheralize the periphery so thoroughly and so eternally that he will never have to discover he was only ever a point where their sightlines crossed. A society organized by such a center becomes the empty city: perfectly hierarchical, perfectly legible, perfectly still—and perfectly depopulated, because everyone real has been pushed to the edges and then off them, until only the eye remains, staring at the rotunda it built to itself, alone.

The world, Whitehead thought—and here was the thread back to his first day—the world is already complex enough. It seethes with genuine process, real relation, irreducible novelty; it overflows every grid laid upon it. And precisely because it is so complex, so uncontrollably alive, the hollow center cannot rule it as it is. So the center does the one thing available to a vanishing point that wishes to become a god: it performs. It stages a simpler world, a flat and legible world, a world with a clear villain and a clear savior and a clear hierarchy of sizes—and it draws the frightened toward the rotunda with a promise that inside the frame, at last, things will hold still.

He had met, on his first two days, the people standing inside such a frame, and the people who maintained the frame's gravity without believing it. Now, before the empty city, the old man saw the thing itself: the method. The seven movements by which a hollow man takes a frightened periphery and makes himself their vanishing point, and then seals every exit, until the only direction anyone can look is in.

He reconstructed it slowly, as one might reconstruct a proof, with his terrible Edwardian courtesy, almost lovingly, the way a physician describes a pathology he means to cure—which is the blackest comedy of all, a gentle metaphysician standing in a museum reverse-engineering a tyranny as though it were a recipe for a soufflé. It went, he found, in seven steps, and it had a name. He called it, for the painting in front of him, the construction of the vanishing point.


II. The Diagnosis — The Structural Provision of Anxiety

It begins, he saw, with the wound—but the center does not invent the wound. This is the thing his conspiracist of the first day had never understood and his despairing professors of the second had understood too well: the pain at the periphery is real. There are emptied towns. There are the places the maps stopped reading, the regions a legible state had ceased to see and therefore ceased to feed (Scott). There is dislocation, the genuine vertigo of a world that has stopped answering to one's actions. The center's first move is not to manufacture this anxiety from nothing. It is to find it, to name it aloud when no one else will, and—this is the craft—to provide it with a structure.

For anxiety unstructured is unbearable, and the researchers had shown why. Strip people of the sense of control, Whitson and Galinsky had demonstrated, and they begin at once to see patterns that are not there, to reach for any order on offer (Whitson and Galinsky 115). Threaten a person's sense of agency, Kay and his colleagues had added, and they will embrace a strong external authority, a controlling God, a firm hand, anything that promises that someone, somewhere, is in charge of the chaos (Kay et al.). The frightened do not want freedom. Freedom is the name of the thing that frightened them. They want a shape for their fear, and a place to stand inside it.

So the center provides the diagnosis. And the diagnosis must be built to a precise and cynical specification: true enough to be felt—it must name a real wound, or it will not bind—and vague enough to be unfalsifiable, so that no fact can ever lift it back off. You have been wronged. They did this to you. The world that abandoned you was not an accident; it was done.The pain is real and the explanation is a forgery, and the forgery sticks precisely because the pain is real—the truth of the ache lends its credibility to the lie about its cause. The center has located the periphery's suffering and offered itself as the only dressing for the wound it has just finished naming.


III. The Mirroring — The Injection of Narcissism

Then the center holds up a mirror, and what it shows the frightened periphery is not the periphery's smallness but its secret grandeur.

This was the genius Whitehead found hardest to watch, because it preyed on the tenderest thing. The follower arrives feeling unseen, peripheral, a thumbnail in someone else's perspective. And the center says: you are not small. You are the real nation. You are the ones who see clearly while the others sleep. You have been wronged because you are important enough to wrong. A psychoanalyst of the century, Kohut, had shown how the self is built by being mirrored—how we become persons by being accurately reflected in another's regard, and how a self starved of that mirroring will hunger for it forever (Kohut). The center offers the starved exactly this, in industrial quantities: a mirror that reflects each follower back enlarged.

And it is the Forer trick again, the one from the first day—the horoscope that each of thirty-nine students received identically and each experienced as uniquely his own (Forer)—but raised now to the scale of a movement. The flattery is mass-produced and feels bespoke. You, specifically, are the salt of the earth, says the center to a stadium of strangers, and every single one of them hears it as a private word. A culture already primed for it, as Lasch had diagnosed—an American century that had made a religion of the self—offered the perfect soil (Lasch).

And then the lock clicks, because the mirroring runs both ways. Having been enlarged by the center's gaze, the follower enlarges the center in return; the two grandiosities interlock and feed; the follower's worship inflates the leader, and the leader's flattery inflates the follower, and the inflation circulates between them in a closed and rising loop. The center has become the follower's mirror, and the follower has become the center's, and neither can now afford to let the other shrink, because each is the source of the other's size.


IV. The Linguistic Hijack — Intermittent Reinforcement and the Variable Reward

Now the center reaches for the words, because to hold a people permanently you must hold the instrument with which they think, and that instrument is language.

The method, Whitehead recognized, had been documented with terrible precision by a psychiatrist named Lifton, who had studied the totalist environments of the prior century and isolated, among his criteria, the one he called loading the language: the compression of the most complex human problems into brief, reductive, definitive-sounding phrases, the thought-terminating clichés that become, as Lifton wrote, the start and finish of any analysis (Lifton 429). Words are hollowed of their old meanings and refilled with new ones available only to the initiated. A private dialect grows. And the dialect does double work: to speak it fluently is to belong, to feel the warm click of the in-group; and to question any term in it is to exile yourself, to mark yourself instantly as one of them, the outsiders, the enemy. A philologist, Klemperer, had kept a secret notebook through the darkest years of Whitehead's own lifetime, recording how a regime had poisoned the ordinary words of a beautiful language one by one, until a man could no longer think a free thought because the very words required for it had been requisitioned (Klemperer). The language itself becomes the cage, and the bars are made of the only words you have left to name your captivity.

And laid over this—here the first day's mechanics fused with the second's—came the reward schedule, gone deliberately variable. The behavioral designers of the engagement economy had rediscovered what the old psychologists knew: that a reward delivered every time is a light switch and bores you, while a reward delivered unpredictably is a slot machine and owns you (Eyal). The center applies this to its own approval. Praise and attack are distributed without pattern; the favored are abruptly cast out, the cast-out abruptly redeemed; no follower can ever rest in having earned the center's regard, because the regard is administered on the schedule of a slot machine, and so each must keep pulling the lever, keep performing the loyalty, keep paying in. The center's very capriciousness—which the naive mistake for weakness, for instability, for the chaos of a disordered man—is in fact the most binding instrument in the kit. He is impossible to predict, the followers say, in awe, never seeing that the unpredictability is the chain. One does not become addicted to a thing that always says yes.


V. The Moral Inversion — The Reversal of the Defect

And now the keystone, the single hinge on which the whole structure turns from a merely manipulative thing into an unfalsifiable one. Here the center performs the alchemy that the first day's epistemics could not survive without: it converts its every defect into proof of its virtue.

Whitehead had felt this coming since his first morning, for it was the secret engine beneath all the rest. A philosopher of the prior century, Nietzsche, had named the operation—the transvaluation of values, the deliberate inversion by which what one had been told was low becomes high, and what was called a vice is revaluated as the truest virtue (Nietzsche). The center performs it on himself, ceaselessly, in real time. His cruelty is revaluated as honesty—he merely says what others are too cowardly to. His ignorance becomes authenticity—he is unspoiled by the corrupt learning of the elites. His lies become telling it like it is. His incoherence becomes a refreshing freedom from the scripts of the political class. Every quality for which his enemies condemn him is reminted, on the spot, into the very coin of his appeal. The faithful wear the flaw as a badge.

And observe what this accomplishes, the old man thought, with something close to professional admiration for the horror of it. It pre-converts all future disconfirmation into confirmation. Once the defect is the virtue, no exposure of the defect can wound; the more the enemies point at the cruelty, the lie, the failure, the more they merely demonstrate how threatened they are, how hard the center must be fighting for you to draw such fire. They attack him because he is winning for you. The accusation has become the proof of the bond. This was the device, Whitehead saw, that made the whole pseudo-system antifragile where every honest belief is fragile—that took the ordinary epistemic vulnerability of a false claim and inverted it into psychological armor. A true belief is held open to refutation; that openness is its honesty and its risk. This belief had sealed the aperture through which refutation enters and welded over it a mirror, so that every arriving disproof saw only its own hostile face and was sent back as fuel.


VI. The Undecidability — The Exploitation of the Unpinnable

Then the center makes himself impossible to locate, and discovers that unlocatability is a fortress.

You can never quite pin him down. Was he serious, or joking? Did he mean it, or was it a provocation, a bit, a troll? The question is not difficult to answer; it is structurally unanswerable, designed to be, and the unanswerability is the weapon. For so long as the irony and the sincerity remain superposed, undecidable, every follower may collapse the wave function privately in whichever direction he needs: the one who wants the cruelty meant hears it meant; the one who needs it to have been a joke hears the joke; and each is sure the others are the ones taking it wrong. And every critic is simultaneously denied a fixed target—accuse him of the sincere version and you are humorless, you missed the joke; accuse him of the joke and you are excusing the sincere thing beneath it. It is the motte-and-bailey raised to the scale of an entire self: the indefensible position always available to be advanced, and the defensible one always available to retreat to, and no one ever able to say which he is standing on, because he is standing, with great agility, on the oscillation between them.

And the painting on the wall gave Whitehead the deepest form of the figure. The center has installed himself at the vanishing point—and a point, he thought, recovering his old geometer's delight even here, a point has no dimensions. It has no width to be measured, no surface to be marked, no interior to be entered. It is the place where all the lines meet and where, precisely for that reason, nothing whatever can be located. He is everywhere implied and nowhere found. The whole perspective bends toward him and there is nothing there to pin. To demand of a vanishing point that it hold still and be examined is to misunderstand what a vanishing point is. It is not a thing in the painting. It is the hole in the painting through which the thing escaped.


VII. The Final Lock-In — The Maximization of Projection

And so the exits are sealed, one after another, until there is no longer any door at all—only wall painted to look like windows.

The first seal is the cost of leaving. By now the follower has invested everything—his grievances named, his grandeur mirrored, his language remade, his loyalty performed through a thousand pulls of the variable lever. To leave now is not to change a position; it is to declare that the self built through all that investment was a fool's self, that the years were wasted, that the enemies were right. The psychologists had mapped this on the small scale long ago: when the prophecy fails and the appointed end of the world does not come, the believers do not disperse in shame—they grow more fervent, and proselytize as never before, because the alternative to deepening the belief is admitting the unbearable (Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter 168). The sunk self cannot be written off. The deeper one is in, the more impossible it becomes to climb out, because the ladder out is built of the confession that one should never have climbed in.

The second seal is projection, run now at maximum gain. Every charge that could be laid against the center is seized and hurled outward onto the enemy, pre-emptively, so that the follower's critical faculty—which might otherwise turn inward toward the rotunda—is permanently aimed away. The center is corrupt; therefore the cry goes up that they are the corrupt ones. The center lies; therefore every unwelcome truth is named a lie, fake, the enemy's fabrication. The accusation is not denied; it is relocated, fired off toward the periphery's designated foe, so that the very evidence that should indict the center is consumed instead as further proof of the enemy's wickedness. The follower's vigilance, his healthy suspicion, his capacity to detect a fraud—all of it is harvested and redirected outward, leaving the center himself in the one blind spot the follower has been trained never to examine.

And the final seal is linguistic, and it is the cruelest, because it removes the tools of escape themselves. Recall what was done to the language in the fourth movement. The words one would need in order to think one's way out have, by now, been redefined to mean their opposite. Truth now names whatever the center says; lie now names whatever the enemy says; freedom now means obedience to the center and slavery means listening to anyone else. Lifton had described the endpoint: the totalist environment arrogates to itself the power to dispense existence, so that those outside the group—and any who leave it—lose all credibility, are unpersons, are not to be heard (Lifton). The follower could, in principle, reason his way to the door. But the proposition I should leave can no longer be formed, because every word he would need to form it has been requisitioned to mean its contrary. He has arrived at the vanishing point. There is no further to go and no way back, because back has been redefined as forward and out as in. This is the exitless point—the place toward which the whole construction was always converging, where the lines meet and the looker can no longer look anywhere but in.


VIII. Coda: The City With No People In It

Whitehead stood a long while before the empty city, and the museum quieted toward closing, and the guards began their soft migration toward the doors.

It was a complete machine. He had reconstructed it without a flaw, and he felt the particular exhaustion of having understood something true and terrible too well. The seven movements locked together into a fortress with no visible door—the diagnosis, the mirror, the hijacked tongue, the inverted vice, the unpinnable point, the maximized projection, the sealed exit. A man could build this. Men had built this, in his century and before it and would again, and the empty perfect city on the panel was its portrait: a civilization organized so totally around its vanishing point that every actual human being had been driven first to the periphery and then clean out of the frame, until nothing remained but the geometry and the longing and the absolute, depopulated silence.

And yet.

He found, looking, that he was not in despair, and he made himself examine why, because he had promised himself on the second day's bridge never again to offer a cheap consolation, and despair would have been the easier and almost the more dignified thing.

Here was the flaw in the fortress, and it was the same flaw he had seen in the painting in the first hour, and it was structural, and it could not be sealed. The vanishing point is generated by the lines. The center is an effect of the periphery's gaze and nothing else—a place where sightlines happen to cross, promoted by a trick to look like a source. Which means the entire stupendous construction rests, at every instant, on one condition and one only: that the periphery keep looking at the center. The lines must keep converging or the point is not there. The throne is made by the kneeling; let the kneeling rise and look at one another instead, and the throne is revealed as the empty chair it always was. The center has no power that the periphery does not, each day, by looking, donate to it. The most total tyranny in the world is also, at its geometric heart, the most dependent thing in the world—a beggar that has convinced the city it is a king, and that will cease to exist the instant the city turns its eyes.

For perspective, he reminded himself, was only a symbolic form. It was invented, around 1420; it was not how the eye sees and not a law of the world; and a thing that was invented can be un-invented, and had been. Cézanne had begun to let the planes tilt and refuse the single sovereign point. The Cubists had shattered the one eye into many and shown the world from everywhere at once, in open mutiny against the tyranny of the fixed spectator. And the camera—Berger had seen this, and it was the sentence Whitehead held longest as the guards drew near—the movie camera, that restless thing that could be anywhere and was never one place, had demonstrated past argument that there was no centre at all, that the converging of the whole world onto a single human eye had only ever been a convention, a beautiful and dangerous lie that one civilization had agreed to call sight.

And the camera gave him his last image, the one that let him leave the museum almost smiling, because it gathered the whole of his three days into a single frame. He thought of the old film—of the faded queen of the silent screen, alone in her crumbling mansion, who had been the center of the world once and could not bear to learn she was now only a point where no lines crossed any longer. And at the end, when the cameras finally came for her, she descended her grand staircase in triumph, certain at last that her public had returned, ready for the close-up she had waited a lifetime to be given again—and the cameras were the newsreels of her arrest, there to film her undoing, and she could not tell the difference. She could not tell adoration from capture, the worshipping gaze from the carceral one, because to a center all attention is the same nutrient, and a vanishing point cannot distinguish the eyes that kneel from the eyes that have come to take it away. She mistook her ending for her apotheosis and walked into the lens that was devouring her, radiant, ruined, ready.

That, Whitehead thought, is the fate written into the construction from the first line. The hollow center's deepest enemy was never the enemy it manufactured. It was process itself—time, change, the living advance that dissolves all centers, the very flow that he had spent two lifetimes insisting was the truth of the world. Death is the most processual thing. And the narcissist's whole war, beneath the diagnoses and the mirrors and the requisitioned words, is a war against time—against the unbearable fact that he is an effect and not a cause, a held breath and not an origin, a close-up that is also, always, an arrest. It is the one war that has never been won, because the thing it is waged against is the thing of which the warrior himself is made. The center declares itself eternal precisely because it is the most temporary thing in the world, and the declaration is the symptom, not the cure.

He turned from the painting at last. The cure, if there was one, was the thing perspective had been invented to forbid: reciprocity. The many eyes. The refusal of the single sovereign gaze. The periphery turning, at long last, to look at one another instead of at the rotunda—and discovering, in that lateral and democratic and gloriously off-center looking, that they had been the source all along, that the city was theirs, that no one had ever lived in the empty piazza because a piazza built for one eye is built for no one.

The guards reached his room. He let himself be ushered out, an old dead Englishman among the last of the day's living, and the museum doors opened onto the actual street, which was full of actual people—none of them arranged for anyone's eye, none of them kneeling, all of them off-center, jostling and unhierarchical and magnificently unwilling to converge on any single point. A man sold pretzels. A child refused to walk. Two strangers argued about nothing on a corner, each the center of their own small and temporary and entirely legitimate world. It was a terrible painting, by the strict rules of perspective. Every line went somewhere different. Nothing vanished toward anything. There was no center anywhere in it.

It was, Whitehead thought, walking out into it, the most beautiful composition he had seen in either of his lives. He went into the crowd, and was, with great relief, no one in particular, and the city closed over him like water over a stone, and held no center, and was alive.


Works Cited

Alberti, Leon Battista. On Painting. 1435. Translated by Cecil Grayson, Penguin, 1991.

Berger, John. Ways of Seeing. British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin, 1972.

Eyal, Nir. Hooked: How to Build Habit-Forming Products. Portfolio, 2014.

Festinger, Leon, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter. When Prophecy Fails. U of Minnesota P, 1956.

Forer, Bertram R. "The Fallacy of Personal Validation: A Classroom Demonstration of Gullibility." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, vol. 44, no. 1, 1949, pp. 118–23.

Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Doubleday, 1959.

Kay, Aaron C., Jennifer A. Whitson, Danielle Gaucher, and Adam D. Galinsky. "Compensatory Control: Achieving Order Through the Mind, Our Institutions, and the Heavens." Current Directions in Psychological Science, vol. 18, no. 5, 2009, pp. 264–68.

Klemperer, Victor. The Language of the Third Reich: LTI—Lingua Tertii Imperii. 1947. Translated by Martin Brady, Continuum, 2000.

Kohut, Heinz. The Analysis of the Self. International Universities Press, 1971.

Lasch, Christopher. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. Norton, 1979.

Lifton, Robert Jay. Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China. Norton, 1961.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals. 1887. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Vintage, 1967.

Panofsky, Erwin. Perspective as Symbolic Form. 1927. Translated by Christopher S. Wood, Zone Books, 1991.

Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale UP, 1998.

Sunset Boulevard. Directed by Billy Wilder, Paramount Pictures, 1950.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. 1929. Corrected ed., edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, Free Press, 1978.

---. Science and the Modern World. 1925. Free Press, 1967.

Whitson, Jennifer A., and Adam D. Galinsky. "Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern Perception." Science, vol. 322, no. 5898, 2008, pp. 115–17.